For the last few weeks at Majors' School, there have been amazingly few Godwin references despite a rapid approach to WWII in our history studies. However, our tactics studies over the last two weeks have been centered on how to plan tactical campaigns around a hypothetical, "conventional military" threat (as opposed to terrorists or insurgents, this refers to linear-type formations with lots of tanks and airplanes). This is commonly known as the "Military Decision Making Process," or MDMP. Strangely, however -- perhaps disappointingly -- the designers of this school apparently think that we as Majors are somehow inculcated with the precise knowledge of this imaginary enemy's doctrine, tactics, and capability.
Some 20 years ago, we studied the old Soviet Union's tactics in depth. My first unit in the Army back then was the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, a storied unit that guarded Germany's "Fulda Gap" against the coming Soviet hordes (successfully, mind you). As a new soldier, I was inundated with all manner of classified and unclassified knowledge about the inner workings of the Red Army's formations. One of my sons was even born in Fulda.
So here we are, winding down over a decade of "asymmetric" warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, and our Army leaders say we need to focus on our "core competencies" (read: linear warfare) and away from counterinsurgency training in our formations. Fine enough -- even though the Soviet Union is no more, many of our enemies still employ their doctrines, equipment, and tactics. Iraq did in 2003, China and "Best Korea" still do, Russia of course still does (but their military is purely defensive), and smaller belligerents still do as well. So why don't we get at least some training on their doctrines?
I'm not really sure, and neither are our instructors.
Maybe we should restart WWII, just so we can use some MDMP training on a real enemy. Any takers?
And that is the last I will think about anything military until next week. Happy Thanksgiving!
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